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Is Libertarian Paternalism an Oxymoron? 
A Comment on Sunstein and Thaler (2003) 
 
 
 
Christophe Salvat 
CNRS-Greqam, Aix-en-Provence 
Robinson College, Cambridge 
 
 
Summary 
 
In this article I have attempted to discuss two points brought up by Sunstein and 
Thaler’s new perspective on paternalism. The first is that whatever individuals do, 
they have to take second rank decisions, i.e. decisions that are equally attractive for 
them but impact others’ people welfare. They then face a three alternative choice: 
either they do not care of the collateral consequences of their choice and act 
randomly, either they select the option that will make others better off, either they 
pick the option that will make others worst off. The authors assume they will 
necessarily act benevolently. I argued this statement is mistaken, and that the authors 
did not sufficiently distinguish the functional and the personal motivations of the 
planners. This leads me to define paternalism as the personal benevolence of the 
planners. Because they do not have any professional or moral duty towards the non-
planners, they have absolutely no obligation to be benevolent. In most cases, the 
easiest choice is to act randomly. This incertitude about the planners’ choice has 
dramatic consequences on non-planners: unless they know and trust the planners they 
cannot expect them to be paternalistic. They are subsequently less prone to blindly 
adopt default rules. The second point of the authors is that one can conceive a 
paternalistic system based on planners’ benevolence that would not infringe 
libertarian principles. Default rules can, for instance, be combined with absolute 
freedom of choice. I argued that freedom of choice would not contribute to individual 
freedom if choices are not voluntary. The easiest they set up opting out options the 
less discriminating their system is, and eventually the most inefficient it will be.  
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1. Introduction  
 
 
In a recent article entitled “Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron”
1
 Cass 
Sunstein and Richard Thaler challenge the common idea that, under some conditions, 
paternalism does not infringe upon the individual’s freedom of choice. Sunstein and 
Thaler propose to dispel the myth of a coercive and morally demeaning paternalism 
which would be incompatible with the liberal spirit of our societies.  
 
For Sunstein and Thaler, the general discrediting of paternalism in modern societies 
can be explained by a false assumption and two misconceptions they propose to 
contest. Firstly, it is commonly assumed that people actually behave as economic 
models expect them to do. The standard of individual rationality formulated by the 
economists has been incorrectly understood as a positive and experimental account of 
human nature. Behaviourist economists like Richard Thaler have demonstrated, 
through numerous experimental studies, how faulty this ‘idée reçue’ can be. The first 
misconception is that there are viable alternatives to paternalism. The question of 
paternalism is always discussed from a moral point of view (‘Is paternalism right or 
wrong?’) when it should be considered from a pragmatic standpoint (‘Since 
paternalism is unavoidable, what can we do to make it acceptable?’). The second 
misconception is that paternalism always involves coercion, and should therefore be 
rejected by those who revere freedom. Paternalism is not, however, the exclusivity of 
the State and most forms of paternalistic actions do not involve any coercion. In any 
case, the authors claim, it should always be possible to avoid coercion of public 
actions by securing freedom of choice. In a book they published in 2008, in which 
they popularize but also further develop their ideas, Sunstein and Thaler term this 
kind of benevolent but non-coercive action a ‘nudge’ (Sunstein & Thaler 2008). 
 
Although I disagree with their conclusions, I believe that Sunstein and Thaler’s view 
of paternalism is very suggestive. Introducing behaviourism into the topic opens up a 
new area of reflection: paternalism is no longer a political or a moral issue, it is an 
element of individual deliberation. Every time a person has to make a decision that 
might impact on others’ lives, she has the choice of paternalism. For an economist, 
and a fortiori a utilitarian, it is a unique chance to go beyond the individuals’ bounded 
rationality, and to improve their welfare. For a libertarian, however, it might represent 
a new and uncontrollable source of infringement to freedom. The concept of 
libertarian paternalism that the authors develop aims at building a bridge between 
them. The present article offers a critical assessment of this concept and discusses its 
main components: inescapability and non-coercion. It also proposes to develop further 
                                                 
1
 The original article has been published in the University of Chicago Law Review, vol.70, 2003, 
pp.1159-1202. Three other versions have been published: Thaler R.H. and Sunstein C.R., (2003), 
‘Libertarian Paternalism’, The American Economic Review, Vol.93, No. 2, May, pp. 175-179; Sunstein 
C. and Thaler R.H, (2006), “Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymoron”, in S.Lichtenstein, P.Slovic 
(eds.), The Construction of Preference, Cambridge University Press, pp.689-707; Sunstein C. and 
Thaler R.H, (2006), “Preferences, Paternalism, and Liberty” in S.Olsaretti (ed.), Preferences and Well-
Being, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, vol.59, Cambridge University Press, pp.233-264. 
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their analysis through two fundamental notions, benevolence and voluntariness, which 
are necessary to characterize paternalism.  Sections 1 and 2 respectively present the 
two misconceptions that the authors offer to clear up. Section 3 critics the idea that 
planners act paternalistically by necessity and suggests an alternative definition of 
paternalism. Section 4 introduces the concept of voluntariness to show that the 
libertarian aspect of libertarian paternalism cannot be ensured by freedom of choice.  
 
 
 
2. Necessity of Paternalism 
 
The term paternalism covers a wide variety of meanings
2
. Joel Feinberg proposes to 
clarify any potential debate by distinguishing two families of paternalism, a 
presumptively blameable and a presumptively non-blameable paternalism (Feinberg 
1986:4). The first kind of paternalism consists of treating adults as if they were 
children (I), and is further subcategorised into benevolent (Ia) and nonbenevolent (Ib) 
paternalism. This last form of paternalism is partly responsible for the negative image 
of paternalism in public opinion, and can be associated, for instance, with the 
condescending attitude of a superior and a patronizing colleague. The second type of 
paternalism is more consensual. It refers to protective actions towards intellectually or 
physically vulnerable persons which match the caring function of parenthood (II). 
Although they are undoubtedly the closest form of parent-like behaviour, neither 
those types of benevolent actions nor the sheer demeaning conducts of Ib will be 
considered as paternalistic in my argument. From now on, I shall refer to paternalism 
as actions or decisions intended to protect someone or promote someone’s welfare 
(Ia).  
 
Paternalism thus characterises prima facie a positive intention or action of a person 
(or a group of persons) B towards a person (or a group of persons) A that would have 
been totally appropriate if A were objectively unable to make responsible decisions. 
The debate around the legitimacy of paternalism is, therefore, necessarily linked to the 
assessment of the degree of responsibility of sane adults and of the degree of 
voluntariness of their actions. The debate has long been focussed on political issues 
opposing liberal thinkers to moral Conservative and pragmatic Utilitarians. Cass 
Sunstein and Richard Thaler have recently made a significant step in reorientating the 
discussion towards individual choice. This very thought-provoking work can lead to a 
more specific definition of a paternalist action and, consequently, to a more detailed 
account of its legitimacy. 
 
Sunstein and Thaler start by discarding the very idea that ordinary human beings 
voluntarily and rationally act in their own best interest. Economists have falsely 
assumed that “almost all people, almost all of the time, make choices that are in their 
best interest or at the very least are better, by their own lights, than the choices that 
would be made by third parties.” (Sunstein & Thaler 2003: 1163). To illustrate their 
argument, they point out that 60% of Americans are considered either obese or 
overweight. It is common knowledge that obesity increases the risk of heart attacks 
and is at the origin of many health problems that may eventually be fatal. It would be 
                                                 
2
 In his article ‘Paternalism’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Dworkin for instances 
distinguishes hard vs soft paternalism, narrow vs broad paternalism, weak vs strong paternalism, pure 
vs impure paternalism and moral vs welfare paternalism. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/  
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preposterous, sustain the authors, to claim that almost all Americans choose their diet 
optimally.   
 
Stating that individuals are unable to correctly evaluate the benefit of the decision 
they are about to make obviously casts doubt on the rationality of decision-making 
process. Over the last twenty years, behavioural economics has yet offered a great 
deal of evidence to support this thesis (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006). The lack of any 
past or similar reference, for instance, introduces an element of arbitrariness in the 
evaluation. Preferences are also claimed to be endogenous to social contexts, and 
consequently inconsistent from one situation to another. Framing, anchors or 
endowment effects show that preferences are substantially shaped by external factors 
which seriously undermine the assumptions of individual sovereignty and preference 
transitivity of the rational choice theory. The authors report that patients who are told 
“Of those who undergo this procedure, 90 percent are still alive after five years” are 
more likely to agree to the procedure than those who are told “Of those who undergo 
this procedure, 10 percent are dead after five years” (Sunstein & Thaler 2003:1161). 
This is what behaviourist economists call a framing effect. It shows that the way 
information is displayed to the economic agents is not neutral. The results of these 
experimental studies naturally question individual rationality, but one would be 
mistaken to entirely discard the concept of rational agents. If anything, they lead to 
new directions of research
3
.  
 
 
Paternalism occurs (according to the authors) when planners take decisions that 
positively affect the choices of the non-planners. As shown in the obesity example, 
people act in a sub-optimally way if they are not appropriately guided in their choices. 
The role played by this third party is then determinant in whether or not they assume 
their paternalist function. The authors claim that “the design features of both legal and 
organizational rules have surprisingly powerful influences on people’s choices. 
[They] urge that such rules should be chosen with the explicit goal of improving the 
welfare of the people affected by them.” (Sunstein, Thaler, 2006: 234).  
 
Sunstein and Thaler do not introduce any moral considerations in their analysis, and 
the motivation of the planners is never questioned. Paternalism is not morally good or 
wrong, it is a logical consequence of individuals’ bounded rationality. Individual 
choices are formed in such a way that they are necessarily influenced by planners’ 
decisions. Are the planners benevolent? To the authors, planners are benevolent by 
default. They are not virtuous or altruist but if they have to choose between two 
equally attractive options when only one also benefits the others, they will necessarily 
pick that one. Because people are not fundamentally evil, every time such a 
configuration occurs, they act paternalistically. Most of the time, they do it 
spontaneously, and people are not even aware of the guidance they have benefited 
from. Because these situations happen all the time, we are all and constantly subject to 
paternalism. To illustrate this idea Sunstein and Thaler take the example of a cafeteria 
                                                 
3
 The idea of coherent arbitrariness of preferences developed by Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein and 
Drazen Prelec, for instance, is based on the following observation:  absolute valuation of goods or 
experience is for a large part arbitrary, but relative valuations prove to be coherent. It interestingly 
suggests that preferences do not exist as such until they are revealed, or more precisely, until they are 
constructed by their enactment. Once the preference has been implemented or ‘imprinted’, related 
valuations are then ordered consistently (Ariely, Loewenstein, Prelec, 2003; 2006). 
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director arranging a line of dishes. According to the authors, she has four alternatives 
(Sunstein, Thaler, 2003: 1164): 
 
1. She could make choices that she thinks would be best for the customers, all 
things considered. 
2. She could make choices at random. 
3. She could choose those items that she thinks would make the customers as 
obese as possible. 
4. She could give customers what she thinks they would choose by themselves. 
 
 
Robert Sugden pointed out that one option is surprisingly missing from the list: the 
cafeteria director might simply choose to display the dishes in the most economically 
efficient way (Sugden 2007). The authors’ reasons for not including it are twofold. 
First they argue that planners are not necessarily looking for profit maximisation. 
Even directors of private companies, like school cafeterias, are not constantly subject 
to market pressures (Sunstein & Thaler 2003: 1165). One could add that some 
planners are not concerned with profit at all whilst others are exclusively profit 
driven, but such a distinction would inevitably raise the issue of the status of the 
planner: Is the planner working for a public administration, for a highly competitive 
private company or for a public utility company? Sunstein and Thaler do not 
distinguish profit driven from non-profit driven planners. Although they hardly give 
any reason for it, I take their position as being justified. I shall come back to this point 
in section 3 and argue that a situation only qualifies as paternalistic when the planners 
go past their functional role and act benevolently towards the non-planners. 
 
Secondly, they claim that “market success will come not from tracking people’s ex 
ante preferences, but from providing goods and services that turn out, in practice, to 
promote their welfare, all things considered. Consumers might be surprised by what 
they end up liking; indeed, their preferences might change as a result of 
consumption.”
4
 (Sunstein & Thaler 2003:1165). For Robert Sugden, consumers may 
have context-dependent preferences instead of ex ante preferences but that does not 
mean they are not sovereign of their choice. Dissatisfied with the idea of second-rank 
preferences he finds too morally connoted, he suggests abandoning the assumption of 
consistent preferences (Sugden 2004). What matters is for individuals to have a broad 
array of options to choose from “whether or not [their] choices reveal any internally 
consistent set of judgments about well-being” (Sugden 2004: 1016). When consumers 
prefer buying the item first displayed (e.g. dessert) over the last one (e.g. fruit), their 
choice does not express an ex ante preference for dessert but a willingness “to pay 
more for ‘dessert early in the line’ than for ‘dessert late in the line’, to an extent that 
outweighs their lesser willingness to pay for ‘fruit late’ rather than ‘fruit early’.” 
(Sugden 2007: 17).  Individuals value the diversity of the opportunities proposed and 
endorse the responsibility of their past choices – they either regret them or not –   as 
well as their futures ones. 
                                                 
4
 Planners may consider appropriate to promote values the non-planners do not currently like on the 
ground that they will eventually learn to like them. But to what extent can we ‘benevolently’ promote 
features of welfare some individuals actually do not enjoy (Arneson 1999)? Are planners legitimate in 
imposing or changing individuals’ preferences as they like? Would planners be legitimate in switching 
people’s preferences for pop music to opera, TV to theatre, table wine to fine wine? This question will 
not be discussed further in this paper as I do not consider the moral aspects of paternalism.  
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Interestingly, Sunstein and Thaler changed their mind about the possibility of a fifth 
option. In Nudge, they eventually add the following alternative: ‘5. Maximize profits, 
period’ but argued that the planner, now named Carolyn, would not choose this option 
at the expense of the children’s health. (Sunstein & Thaler 2008:2). This resaoning, I 
believe, contains two mistakes. By featuring the planner as a school cafeteria director, 
they considerably narrow down the relevance of their example. What may be true for 
a school cafeteria is not necessarily true for a regular cafeteria or a supermarket. But, 
more importantly, they conflate the personal benevolence of Carolyn (she loves 
children) with her functional role as a planner (providing balanced meals to children).  
 
In the example of the cafeteria, the director has only three options. Option 4 
represents the anti-paternalist option. It relies on two assumptions:  the first one is that 
consumers have ex ante preferences and the second one is that planners are able to 
identify them. Behaviourist economists dismiss the first one. Even if one disagrees 
with them, it is reasonable to admit that planners have no means of knowing what 
these preferences would be. Consequently, this option can not be logically considered. 
Three options then remain. The second and third options are immediately discarded 
by the authors. Rejecting option 2 seems very reasonable. One does not expect a good 
manager to adopt a random criterion of organization. Option 3 seems at first sight 
similarly unattractive. It is difficult to imagine a manager possessed by the desire to 
make her clients fat
5
.  
 
The first option, the paternalist one, is thus presented, by default, as the only possible 
one. All of the non-paternalist alternatives, conclude the authors, are not viable. From 
this example, Sunstein and Thaler infer that “a form of paternalism cannot be avoided, 
and that the alternatives to paternalism (such as choosing options to make people 
worse off) are unattractive” (Sunstein & Thaler 2003: 1159). I shall argue in section 3 
that if alternatives to paternalism may well be unattractive, they are nonetheless 
viable.  
 
 
3. Preference for Default Rules  
 
I would like to turn now to the libertarian feature of Sunstein and Thaler’s paternalism 
which advocates a total freedom of choice for individuals. The authors refute the 
common view according to which libertarians could not accept paternalism, or that 
alternatively paternalists should necessarily dispel libertarianism. Though this seems 
to be a contradiction in terms, Sunstein and Thaler intend to demonstrate that it is not 
(Sunstein & Thaler 2003:1160). They argue that, although planners can steer people’s 
choices or even enrol them in default rules, individuals are nonetheless free to make 
their own choices.  
 
The benefits of libertarian paternalism are illustrated by two cases of change in setting 
default rules, the case of 401 (k) employee savings plans (Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & 
Metrick, 2002; Madrian & Shea, 2001) and the authors’ own experience of the 
University of Chicago’s car park payment system. In the first case, employers decide 
                                                 
5
 In Nudge, this option is abandoned and replaced by a most unlikely ‘Maximize the sales of the items 
from the suppliers that are willing to offer the largest bribes’ (but Carolyn, the director, is “honourable 
and honest, so she does not give this option any thought” Sunstein & Thaler 2008:3). 
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that instead of letting their employees join a savings plan, the American 401 (k) plan, 
they would automatically enrol them unless they specifically stated they did not wish 
to be included. When eligible, employees usually receive a 401 (k) plan form that they 
must complete in order to join. In this case, however, employees only receive a 
statement in which they are told that, unless they opt-out, they are automatically 
enrolled in the plan. In both studies, a significant increase of the joining rates has been 
observed (from 49 percent to 86 percent in Madrian & Shea 2001).  
 
In the second case, a change in the tax law made it possible for employees to pay for 
employer-provided parking on a pre-tax basis. The University of Chicago presumed 
that, although being in the employees’ interest, many of them would not take the 
trouble to fill in and send back the form and decided to enrol all employees 
automatically. Those who preferred to pay with after-tax dollars were, however, free 
to opt out. Had the university chosen a different default rule (like an ‘opt in’ strategy), 
the authors reckon that “many employees, especially faculty members (and probably 
including the present authors), would still have that form buried somewhere in their 
offices and would be paying substantially more for parking on an after-tax basis” 
(Sunstein & Thaler 2003:1171).  
 
Enrolling individuals by default rules presents obvious benefits over active choices. In 
some cases, in particular when decisions are technical or unusual, agents experience a 
strong aversion to decide and therefore procrastinate. Recent developments in 
behavioural economics demonstrated that minor (and sometimes irrelevant) reasons 
are sufficient for an individual making a decision in one way rather than in the other
6
. 
A minor effort, such as filling in a form, is often a sufficient reason not to opt in. “By 
contrast, a thoughtfully chosen default rule, steering them in sensible directions, is a 
blessing.” (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003:1199). In this case, the default rule is praised as a 
general preference not to have to decide in a certain number of matters.  
 
This general preference for default rules is reinforced by the belief that, in addition to 
being bothersome, autonomous decisions are more likely to be less efficient than the 
‘thoughtfully chosen default rule’. Whether individuals are rational or not, they are 
always interested in increasing the rationality of their behaviour (Harsanyi 1982: 42). 
This behavioural trend has recently been empirically observed by Christopher Hsee, 
Jiao Zhang, Frank Yu and Yiheng Xi who showed that, when it comes to making a 
decision, individuals tend to give more weight to what they call the ‘rationalistic’ or 
objective factors than to their own subjective values
7
. In many cases, default rules are 
                                                 
6
 Reason-based choice, as it has been termed, considers choice as a ‘reasoned’ or weighted selection of 
options (March 1994, Prelec & Herrstein 1991; Simonson 1989, Simonson & Nowlis 2000). This 
approach usually describes cases where none of the proposed options correspond to the individual’s 
initial preferences or situations in which all options are equally attractive (Hafir, Simonson & Tversky 
1993). 
7 They asked two groups of students to buy a stereo. Two equally expensive models are proposed, Sony 
A and Sony B, offering different qualities in terms of sound richness and power. The first group is told 
that Sony A has a greater sound richness, which corresponds to their preference, but that Sony B is 
more powerful, an attribute presented as objective. The second group is told that Sony A has 
objectively a richer sound but that they prefer the more powerful sound of Sony B, an attribute 
presented as totally subjective. The result of this experiment was that students who believed power an 
objective attribute decided to buy the more powerful model in spite of their preference for sound 
richness, and that the students who believed sound richness to be an objective attribute decided to buy 
model A instead of enjoying model B as theory would predict (Hsee, Zhang, Yu, Xi, 2003).  
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actually superior to personal choices. Sunstein and Thaler thus explore in their book 
the example of the Swedish privatization of social security in 2000. Swedish citizens 
initially faced 456 different available funds to compare and choose from. A strong 
advertising campaign encouraged them to actively choose one fund rather than 
picking the default portfolio which was eventually adopted by a third of them. As it 
happens, the default portfolio, sensibly designed by financial experts, turned out to be 
the most efficient, or rather the less disastrous one. Unused to buying financial assets, 
most Swedish citizens turned towards Swedish companies; on average the actively 
chosen portfolios were composed with 96.2% of shares, half of them for Swedish 
companies, and in particular, stock in technology and health care.  During the 
financial bubble, these assets hugely increased in value: the most popular fund, Robur 
Aktiefond Contura  increased by 534.2% between 1995 and 2000, giving the 
impression that they were solid investments. While the average portfolio of the 
actively chosen funds lost 39.6% in the first three years, the default fund, more 
diversified, ‘only’ lost 29.9% (Sunstein & Thaler 2008:151). 
 
Associated with the complete freedom to opt out, default rules are regarded by the 
authors as a perfectly acceptable form of paternalism. Libertarian paternalism, as they 
call it, is construed as “a relatively weak and nonintrusive type of paternalism, 
because choices are not blocked or fenced off.” (Sunstein & Thaler 2003: 1162). In 
practice, however, default rules are sticky and guaranteeing the conditions of free 
choice is difficult. Once a person has been enrolled in a default rule, he or she tends to 
overestimate its benefits. This phenomenon, called the endowment effect 
(Loewenstein & Adler 1995), has been observed in particular by Cass Sunstein with 
employees who value rights only because they have been granted them in the first 
place (Sunstein 2002; Sunstein & Thaler 2003:1174). If opting in is a deterrent for 
many peoples, opting out from a default rule is even more dissuasive. To respect 
freedom of choice, a libertarian planner must set up a default rule that will be easy 
and costless for individuals to opt out. Ideally, it should not be more demanding than 
a ‘one-click’ procedure (Sunstein & Thaler 2008: 249). 
  
 
 
 
4. Benevolence and libertarian paternalism 
 
As previously mentioned, the first misconception that underpins anti-paternalism is 
“that there are viable alternatives to paternalism” (Sunstein & Thaler 2003:1164). 
Sunstein and Thaler claim that planners have no other choice than to act benevolently. 
I would like to challenge this view. I want to argue here that being benevolent is 
entirely the choice of the planners, and that paternalism is only one possibility 
amongst others. Although the proportion of planners being malevolent is probably 
limited, the very possibility that they may be malevolent has dramatic consequences. 
Prior to embarking on this discussion, it is essential to stress the importance of the 
distinction introduced by Sunstein and Thaler between planners (they are called 
choice architects in Nudge but I shall keep the term ‘planner’ here) and non-planners. 
Herein lies the critical contribution of their work, although I believe they did not fully 
exploit it. 
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A planner is a person (or a group of persons) whose function dictates (Queen, judge, 
school teacher, director of cafeteria…) that they make decisions which will 
necessarily affect – for better or for worse –  the life of a certain number of other 
persons she is not directly related to. To a certain extent, we are all planners and all 
subject to the decisions of numerous planners that we are not even aware of. The 
traditional distinction between public and private, or between representatives and 
citizens, thus becomes irrelevant. The law is only one device amongst others through 
which one can promote people’s interests. Paternalism is a matter of individual choice 
rather than of a public policy. In spite of our common bounded rationality, each of us 
benefits in his respective function (and because of it) from a specialised and more 
objective knowledge of a limited number of subjects that others lacks, but which 
could be very valuable to them. The planner has the choice of whether or not to use 
this knowledge to make rules in their favour. If they do, as the authors expect them to, 
they are said to be ‘paternalistic’. I contend, however, that a positive act by the 
planners towards the non-planners is not a sufficient condition to characterise a 
paternalistic action.  
 
Sunstein and Thaler fail to take full advantage of their idea, and, in particular, do not 
distinguish the choice that a planner has to make as a planner from the choice she has 
to make as a person. A planner should not be considered as a particular person who 
makes decisions based on who she is (fat/slim, happy/sad, male/female, 
married/single, straight/gay, black/white) but as a person holding a functional role, 
and who is expected to make decisions on this basis alone. Her benevolent or 
malevolent feelings towards her pupils, defendants or customers are irrelevant when it 
comes to making a professional decision. But her skills as a planner alone do not 
determine the decision-making process, and more often than not, she will have to 
make personal choices in addition to professional ones. If a doctor prescribes 
medications to save a patient’s life, she does not act paternalistically but according to 
her functional role. Now suppose that the patient is distraught by the announcement of 
having a potentially deadly disease and that the doctor, feeling sorry for him, walks 
him back home or gives him a hug. In that case, the doctor definitively acts 
paternalistically. Whether or not a planner has the goal of promoting other people’s 
welfare or not is therefore not relevant to our discussion. Sunstein and Thaler were 
thus right not to distinguish planners who were profit-driven from those who were 
not. What really characterizes paternalism is not the positive impact of the planners’ 
functional decisions but the sheer benevolence with which they act beyond their 
professional or institutional assignment.  
 
Suppose that the cafeteria director decides to order 15 dishes from the more to the less 
profitable ones and that she finds out that three sets of 5 dishes are equally profitable. 
She knows that some of them are healthier than others. As a planner, she is indifferent 
to the inner order of each set. (I am assuming here that promoting consumers’ health 
is not part of her job.) How will she arrange her display? She has only three 
alternatives. The first possibility is that, in addition to being functionally indifferent to 
the way each set is displayed, she is personally unconcerned by her consumers’ 
health. In that case, she orders the dishes at random. The second possibility is that, 
despite being functionally indifferent to equally profitable dishes, she cares about the 
consumers’ health and makes it a point of honour to provide them with healthy food. 
She accordingly orders the dishes in such a way that the consumers will preferably 
buy what is best for them. This is a case of paternalism and the option selected by 
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Sunstein and Thaler. In the third and final possibility (‘She could choose those items 
that she thinks would make the customers as obese as possible’), she is motivated by 
malevolent or envious feelings. Within each equally profitable set of dishes, she will 
then order fat and sweet dishes first.  
 
The authors hold that the cafeteria director will necessarily pick the benevolent 
option. I wish here to challenge this view and demonstrate that paternalism is not 
unavoidable. The second option proposed by the authors (‘She could make choices at 
random’) is a viable choice since it does not undercut her functional status nor strip 
her of all credibility. When she makes this choice, she has already acted as a planner. 
She has fulfilled her professional responsibility. Ordering the dishes at random is not 
only a possible but a worthwhile choice since it is the simplest and the quickest one.  
The third option (‘She could choose those items that she thinks would make the 
customers as obese as possible’) is, for the same reason, equally possible. Once she 
has fulfilled her function as director of the cafeteria, she has no more reason a priori 
to be benevolent than to be malevolent towards her clients
8
. Imagine, for instance, that 
the cafeteria director is unhappily overweight. A subjective approach to welfare, such 
as the one developed by Pigou on relative incomes (Pigou 2002), would conclude that 
her welfare does not depend on her absolute weight, but on her deviation from the 
mean or more simply from social pressure
9
. One can easily imagine that thinking that 
her clients will get fatter makes her feel less miserable. This gives her a real incentive 
to highlight fat dishes when organizing her display
10
.  
 
Option 3 is therefore also a viable alternative to paternalism. From a libertarian 
vantage point, one cannot deny this opportunity to the planner without infringing 
upon her self-ownership. Self-ownership excludes the possibility of individuals not 
having the choice not to be benevolent
11
. This notably implies that, as a free person, I 
don’t have any moral obligation to others and that I cannot be forced to benevolence 
either directly or through a redistributive system (Nozick 1974). An immediate 
objection to this assertion is, of course, that such malevolent behaviour is exceptional 
and need not, therefore, be taken into account. I would argue, firstly, that malevolent 
behaviour is considered exceptional because it is considered as virtually nonexistent 
by economists and not the other way round. So far, altruism has received much more 
attention from economists than envy (Kirchsteiger 1995; Mui 1995). But, more 
importantly, stating that an action is ‘benevolent’ or ‘malevolent’ is a risky 
                                                 
8
 The example of the cafeteria is a bit confusing since it is possible that the cafeteria has a public health 
mission, e.g. schools cafeteria. 
9
 A recent survey on well-being and income in South Africa (Kingdon and Knight 2007) shows that at 
equal income, a White feels relatively deprived (being a ‘poor’ member of the rich race) when a Black 
feels satisfied or very satisfied (being a ‘rich’ member of the poor race). Should the policy maker help 
in priority those who feel deprived over those who are satisfied? 
10
 It does not mean however that she will deliberately try to harm the consumers. Planners, and more 
generally human beings, often subconsciously act malevolently. If asked, they would probably 
genuinely deny having any evil intentions. 
11
 Sunstein and Thaler naturally acknowledge this libertarian principle. They however argue that if 
benevolence cannot be forced, it can be artificially prompted while freedom of choice is respected. The 
different systems of organs donations adopted by European and American countries illustrate that 
possibility. When Americans need to actively express their consent to be removed organs when they 
die, some Europeans countries such as France presuppose that French implicitly consent to give organs 
unless explicitly stated. The authors reckon that the French setting of the default rule does not infringe 
on individuals’ freedom of choice and that a change in the American policy could save thousands of 
lives each year. They call it libertarian benevolence. 
 11 
declaration to make; cases exist where a single action can have multiple opposing 
consequences on differing populations. The director of the cafeteria may, for instance, 
decide to promote gluten-free dishes out of sympathy for those who are allergic to it, 
at the expense of all those who are not. On the other hand, she could also decide to 
promote iron-supplemented food because it improves most people’s diet even though 
it is highly contraindicated for those who suffer from hemachromatosis
12
. The 
addition of iron, unbeknownst to the consumers, has much more negative 
consequences for the minority affected by this condition compared to the small 
benefit it gives to the immense majority of people.  
 
Default rules, however benevolent they may be, propose a unique ideal of welfare 
which is unlikely to meet the diversity of situations. Should the initial intention of the 
planner be primarily considered to characterise the ‘benevolence’ of her action? If so, 
a xenophobic measure could be seen as benevolent (and hence paternalistic) as it 
promotes the interests of the planner’s community despite the consequences to other 
communities. A utilitarian may argue, however, that in such cases, a benevolent 
action is one that takes into consideration the general balance of benefits and 
disadvantages produced by the action and considering each individual as equal. But 
the evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages conjointly produced remains an 
intricate business
13
. In all the cases where individuals have different interests but are 
subject to the same decision of a planner, it is difficult to assign a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ 
meaning to the planner’s decision. 
 
But, apart from the fact that utilitarianism is difficult to combine with the authors’ 
libertarianism (section 4), this kind of response misses the fundamental point the 
authors failed to notice: individuals allow themselves to be enrolled in default rules 
only when they trust the planners. Even in the very implausible case where all 
planners are inspired by good intentions, non-planners will not all benefit from the 
plan; some of them may even be harmed by it. Since the default rules that 
systematically enrol everyone do not clearly identify those who will benefit from it 
from those who won’t, non-planners have no choice but to trust the planner. In many 
cases, this trust is entirely justified, as illustrated by the Swedish default portfolio. In 
some others, however, complying with the planners is not recommended. Consider 
now the case when a non-planner does not know the planner and vice-versa (a first-
time consumer in the cafeteria for instance). Even if this person is naturally trusting, 
she cannot exclude the possibility of an unintentional harm that could result from 
complying to the plan or the default rule. Nor can she exclude the possibility that the 
planner may have acted randomly
14
. Should she blindly comply with the default rule? 
This would be irrational. Default rules are accepted by individuals firstly because it 
prevents them from procrastination and secondly because they supposedly embody a 
higher rationality. If people have to systematically assess the default rules before 
adopting them, they lose all interest. Introducing scepticism about the benefits of the 
                                                 
12
 Hemachromatosis is a hereditary disease characterised by an excessive quantity of iron accumulated 
in the body and which disrupts normal functions of organs such as liver, heart and pancreas. Iron 
supplemented food, like cereals or ‘healthy’ biscuits, worsens this condition. 
13
 To set up default rules, planners can either use a technical process, the economists’ Cost Benefit 
Analysis (CBA), or alternatively the more intuitive rules of the thumb. CBA is, however, difficult to 
implement in cases where preferences are incoherent (Sugden 2007). 
14
 When the United-States tried to implement a private social security system such as the one 
establishes in Sweden, the default portfolio had been randomly selected. 
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default rules (or the benevolence of the planners) basically ruins the system of 
libertarian paternalism.   
 
 
5. Voluntariness and Freedom of Choice 
 
I turn now to the libertarian feature of Sunstein and Thaler’s paternalism that they 
describe as “a relatively weak and nonintrusive type of paternalism” (Sunstein and 
Thaler 2003:1162). Libertarian paternalists, like any other libertarian theorists, defend 
absolute freedom of choice. Mandatory rules should be the exception. But unlike 
traditional theories of libertarianism, based on self ownership, libertarian paternalism 
exclusively relies on freedom of choice. It is rooted in a very weak notion of 
voluntariness that makes it closer to hard paternalism.  
 
According to Mill’s first principle, “the only purpose for which power can be 
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient 
warrant.” (Mill, 1989: 13). Mill’s seemingly unambiguous claim, however, fostered 
different views on the exact meaning of the expression ‘against his will’. Is Mill 
referring to an immediate desire or to a deliberate will? And, if Mill really means will, 
as Gerald Dworkin suggests it, could this will be irrational
15
? For example, could 
someone autonomously and deliberately want to alienate his freedom? The degree of 
voluntariness granted to individuals’ actions determines whether it falls into the 
category of a soft or a hard type of paternalism.  
 
Soft or weak paternalism typically describes situations of involuntary acts or 
misinformed decisions that must be interfered with for the person’s own good. 
Typically, a soft paternalist can legitimately prevent a person from using the saltcellar 
if she has not been informed that it contains arsenic instead of salt. Similarly, a person 
under the influence of drug or alcohol can be temporarily prevented from making 
decisions that he/she may bitterly regret the next day (Feinberg 1986). On the other 
hand, if I am appropriately informed of the risks I incur from crossing a dangerous 
bridge, smoking, or duelling, no external interference is ever justifiable to stop me 
performing or carrying out such an action
16
. Soft paternalism re-establishes what 
some regard as an essential feature of liberalism: the right to act irrationally.  
 
                                                 
15
 In his first article on paternalism, Dworkin refutes this possibility and misleadingly associates 
voluntariness, autonomy and rationality. He changes his mind in Paternalism, Second Thoughts . A 
paternalist action, thus reconsiders Dworkin, characterises a usurpation of decision making (Dworkin 
1988: 123). 
16 In some cases, however, it’s not necessarily true. To understand this, it is important to introduce 
Feinberg’s distinction between reasonable and rational. Person A can judge person B’s action 
unreasonable either because she believes person B’s risk assessment incorrect or because she would 
not act herself on such a risk level. Knowing that the bridge has a probability of 60% to collapse, for 
instance, B decides nevertheless to cross it. A disapproves B she believes unreasonable but has no right 
to stop her. Now, suppose a different situation where A knows for sure that the bridge will fall down if 
she attempts to cross it but is still resolute to cross it to visit a friend. B’s action is then judged 
irrational, and B insane or mentally impaired and A has the moral duty to stop her. The reason of this 
is that one cannot simultaneously want to cross a bridge and die on it. In this case, but in this case only, 
a coercive action on a voluntary and purely self-regarding action is considered as legitimate 
(paternalism type II). 
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Arneson argues against Dworkin that mistakes and wrongdoings cannot be considered 
as involuntary even if they seem objectively irrational. He considers paternalism 
illegitimate if individual choice matches the description of what he calls a weak 
notion of voluntariness.  A person acts voluntarily “if and only if his choice of the act 
(a) would not be abandoned if he were apprized of all the act’s unforeseeable 
consequences, (b) does not proceed from an emotional state so troubled as to preclude 
the full use of the reasoning faculty, and (c) does not occur under conditions of 
external coercion or compulsion.” (Arneson, 1980: 482). It has been argued that this 
liberal form of paternalism could equally be understood as a soft paternalism as well 
as a soft anti-paternalism (Feinberg 1986). Soft paternalism indeed only interferes 
with impairing and external factors to the will. Technically speaking, it does not limit 
freedom.  
 
Hard paternalism, on the contrary, is by nature coercive. To Gerald Dworkin, for 
instance, paternalism covers “the interference with a person’s liberty of action 
justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, 
interests or values of the person coerced” (Dworkin 1972:65). It legitimizes 
interference from voluntary and well-informed actions. Among all the possible 
examples, Dworkin mentions laws requiring motorcyclists to wear safety helmets, 
laws regulating sexual conduct, such as homosexuality between consenting adults in 
private, laws forbidding people from swimming at a public beach when lifeguards are 
not on duty and laws compelling people to save a fraction of their income in 
retirement plans. Although some of these examples could not be considered as 
paternalistic today, either because they involve a third element (the economic cost 
borne by the society) or because they are no longer considered self-destructive or 
wrong (homosexuality), these examples are representative of an essential feature of 
hard paternalism: the source of risk assessment. Whilst supporters of soft paternalism 
consider risk assessment as the risk taker’s responsibility, risk is externally assessed 
by the paternalistic agent
17
.  
 
Sunstein and Thaler’s libertarian paternalism borrows features from these two 
opposite approaches. Its spirit is libertarian: individual choice is always respected, 
however self-destructive it may be. The authors are in favour of governmental rules 
that guide rather than compel whenever this is possible. Sunstein and Thaler thus 
defend a privatization of social security, retirement plans, education (for those 
countries which have not yet done so) and even of marriages. Bans, such as bans from 
riding motorcycles without a helmet, should be limited as much as possible (Sunstein 
and Thaler 2008:232-33). Every time a hindrance on individual freedom of choice can 
be avoided through a simple ‘nudge’, the authors support it by encouraging initiative 
– which could be either public or private – over regulation.  
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 In cases like the obligation to wear seat belt or helmets when driving a car or a motorcycle, personal 
and public risk assessments converge. Most of the people do not feel coerced as they voluntary fasten 
their seat belt. In forcing their children to wear helmets when cycling, or in wearing one themselves 
while it is not compulsory, parents implicitly recognise the voluntary feature of this rule. These rules 
can be both supported by partisans of soft and hard paternalism. But in some other cases, however, the 
difference between a person’s subjective risk assessment and the paternalistic authority prompts 
coercion. In the case of the swimming ban cited by Dworkin, good swimmers’ liberty is curtailed 
because of the potential risk incurred by bad and irresponsible swimmers.  
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Sunstein and Thaler hold that dogmatic libertarianism and dogmatic paternalism are 
incompatible. It is true to a certain extent, but most libertarians and paternalists are 
not dogmatic. Besides, being dogmatic is not what matters here. The degree of 
compatibility between libertarianism and paternalism essentially relies on the degree 
of voluntariness one confers on an individual’s actions. A ‘dogmatic’ libertarian 
would thus be someone who considers all human actions as fully voluntary, and hence 
all intervention as illegitimate. A ‘dogmatic’ paternalist, on the contrary, would be 
someone who considers all human actions as potentially involuntary and hence 
subject to legitimate interference. Libertarians and paternalists, however, largely agree 
that some actions are fully voluntary whilst some others are undoubtedly involuntary. 
I can, for instance, consider that an action is involuntary - and subject to State 
interference - if some information has been hidden from me. Most libertarians agree 
that contracts can be broken by a third party when one party has been intentionally 
deceived by the other. This is what we previously referred to as soft paternalism. In 
this case, libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron. Now, the question for us is the 
following: Is Sunstein and Thaler’s libertarian paternalism an oxymoron?  
 
Sunstein and Thaler’s libertarian paternalism is not a form of soft paternalism. Their 
analysis, based on behavioural studies, shows, however, that most individual choices 
are sub-optimal because their valuations depend on arbitrary anchors and frames. 
Their actions reflect the context in which they have been carried out rather than the 
proper preferences of the agents who welcome an external aid to help them make the 
right choice. To a certain degree, most of their actions are involuntary: they want to 
be thin but eat fatty foods, they want to have a comfortable retirement but don’t save 
enough money, they want to donate their organs but don’t say so etc. Actions are not 
made involuntary because information is hidden but because individuals misuse it. 
Bounded rationality is at the heart of Sunstein and Thaler’s paternalism. Such a weak 
concept of voluntariness usually characterises hard paternalism. The difference 
between them and Dworkin is, however, that paternalistic interference should never 
be coercive. Individuals should always be offered alternatives. The libertarian feature 
of their theory relies exclusively on freedom of choice. Yet there is an incongruity at 
the defending absolute freedom of choice and a weak concept of voluntariness both at 
the same time. By discarding self-ownership, the authors actually undermined the 
possibility of libertarian paternalism.  
 
The number of opportunities a person gets is not relevant to assess her degree of 
freedom. Let me explain this by borrowing an example originally presented by 
Locke
18
. A prisoner is brought into a cell and is convinced that all the doors are 
locked when actually one has been left unlocked. Is this person free to get out? A 
libertarian like Nozick would answer in the affirmative. Technically, nobody 
physically stops him from getting out. He is not coerced to stay inside. A 
behaviourist, or for that matter a philosopher of autonomy like Dworkin, would argue, 
however, that since the prisoner is not aware of this opportunity, he is not any freer 
than if all the doors were actually locked. In the same way as in the cafeteria, where 
the order of the dishes is more significant to the consumers than their presence, the 
information given about the doors is more significant to the prisoner than their real 
state. If individuals were as rational as the economists suppose them to be (if they 
                                                 
18
 I borrow this example myself from Dworkin who used it to support his distinction between liberty 
and autonomy (Dworkin 1988:14). 
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were ‘Econs’ to borrow Sunstein and Thaler’s terminology), they would not be 
subject to framing or anchor effects. They would correctly use the information they 
are given to maximise their welfare and all their actions would result from deliberate 
and well-informed decisions. Their actions would then be regarded as fully voluntary.  
 
Having the possibility of opting out from default rules is not necessarily a sign of 
increased freedom. Libertarians hold that one is free insofar as one has different 
possible alternatives. Freedom and voluntariness are conflated because, except in the 
case of coercion, all actions are presumed voluntary (Nozick 1974). Introducing non-
voluntary actions, however, undermines the importance of the number of options. Are 
only significant the options that are voluntary chosen. In some cases, a larger number 
of opportunities alienates rather than promotes freedom (Dworkin 1988). Libertarians 
thus defend the right of a person to voluntarily restrain her future freedom of choice
19
. 
Covenant marriages, for instance, are specially designed for those who, usually for 
religious reasons, want to make divorce extremely difficult (Sunstein & Thaler 
2008:220)
20
. A possible justification for this kind of contract is that I want to restrain 
my future non-voluntary actions. Ulysses thus commands his men to bind him to the 
mast so he would not to be tempted to jump into the sea when the sirens sing. 
Similarly, I may not feel coerced if all alternatives are banned except the one I would 
have voluntarily chosen. Olsaretti’s example of the wired city perfectly exemplifies 
this case: “Wendy is the inhabitant of a city fenced with electrifying wire, which she 
is unfree to leave. However, her city has all that anyone could ever ask for, and 
Wendy, who is perfectly happy with her life there, has no wish of leaving it. She 
voluntarily remains in her city.” (Olsaretti 2004:138).  
 
In Sunstein and Thaler’s 401 (k) plan example, rationality imposes adherence to the 
default rule. Everyone wants to receive a pension but there is a great temptation to 
indefinitely postponing saving for it. Our preference for the present prompts us to 
spend when we would really have preferred to save: what is in play in pension plans is 
man’s weakness of will. Planners who automatically enrol everyone into a retirement 
plan assume that not actively joining the plan is a non-voluntary action rather than a 
voluntary one. Paternalism can legitimately be accepted here. And, because some 
individuals might voluntarily not join the plan (e.g. they know that they will die 
before being eligible for retirement), it is essential to set an opting-out option. But 
such an option must be able to discriminate between a voluntary and non-voluntary 
desire to pull out. One may, for instance, require a medical consultation. The mistake 
the authors make is, I believe, to reduce the cost of opting out to zero (a ‘one-click’ 
procedure) to prop up freedom of choice. The easier it is to opt out, the more 
ineffective the default rule becomes. In this particular example, if individuals are 
totally free to opt out, all those who have an excessive preference for the present (the 
poor, gamblers, spendthrifts, alcoholics…) will turn down their employer’s offer. In 
                                                 
19 Such a possibility would be discarded by liberals such as John Stuart Mill for whom “The principle 
of freedom cannot require that [man] should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to 
alienate his freedom.” Partisans of paternalism diverge on this question. For Feinberg, a person may 
voluntarily commit or even transfer to someone else his future ability to autonomously choose. On the 
contrary, Dworkin claims that individuals should never be allowed to definitively impair or renounce 
their freedom of choice. 
20
 Giving up the capacity to opt out from automatic enrolment is a possibility that paradoxically cannot 
be excluded as it would infringe the individuals’ freedom of choice. Sunstein and Thaler thus seriously 
advocate the possibility for medical patients to waive their right to sue their doctor for negligence in 
return for a lower price of care (Sunstein & Thaler 2008, chapter 14). 
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other words, all those who especially need the default rule will not benefit from it. In 
that case, libertarian paternalism is an oxymoron.  
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Because it is pragmatic and intellectually challenging, Sunstein and Thaler’s concept 
of libertarian paternalism may appeal to a wide range of thinkers. The utility of 
implementing costless but efficient default rules, such as tacit consent in organ 
donations, deserves to be highly defended, not only from a pragmatic point of view 
but also from liberal (and even libertarian) theoretical perspective. In succeeding to do 
so, Sunstein and Thaler significantly contribute to the renewal of liberalism, which 
had too often been prisoner of the dichotomy ‘the State versus the Individual’. Basing 
their approach on behavioural economics, the authors brilliantly show that the real 
debate about paternalism and interference in individuals’ freedom is not restricted to 
political philosophy. In particular, the idea of dividing individual choice into two 
categories – the ‘planners’ who make decisions that they know are decisively 
influential to other people’s choices, and the ‘non-planners’ who are surreptitiously 
led to make the best decision for themselves –  is very constructive.  
 
The authors, however, seem not to take full advantage of this distinction and reduce 
the planner to a person (preferably a benevolent one) instead of dividing the planner’s 
choice into a functional part and a personal part. This further refinement would have 
permitted, as we have shown, (1) to narrow down the area of paternalistic actions to 
the sole ‘personal’ decisions of the planner and (2) to circumscribe the uncertainty of 
benevolent actions to this area. Planners, including good planners, are totally free to 
choose whether or not to be paternalistic. When it comes to the personal component 
of the planner’s choice, a random decision is – from her point of view – as good as a 
paternalistic one. In the absence of clear information, default rules set up outside the 
functional role of the planner should not a priori been considered as paternalistic. 
 
The argument according to which non-planners are still free to opt out if they believe 
that the default rule is not in their particular interest (and hence that the default rule is 
always worth implementing) presents another difficulty. Because the decisions of 
non-planners are presumed involuntary (and are supported by behavioural evidences), 
their freedom of choice cannot reasonably be comprehended as a matter of 
opportunities of choice. The easier it becomes to opt out of the default rule, the 
greater is the risk that the default rule will not help those who need it most. The 
libertarian concern of Sunstein and Thaler should be exclusively focussed on the 
planners’ choice since they are the only ones able to make voluntary choices. 
Ironically, their only option is to be benevolent.  
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